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EMPLOYERS' WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
OBLIGATIONS AND THE BANKRUPTCY TAX
PRIORITY
JAMES B. HAINES, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
With business failures occurring at the highest levels since the Great De-
pression, the prospect of bankruptcy looms large for many enterprises.1 Relief
available under the Bankruptcy Reform Act2 includes a stay of the collection
activities of pressing creditors 3 and, for individual debtors, a discharge of pre-
bankruptcy indebtedness.4
The discharge available in bankruptcy is not without exception, however,
and those counseling financially embarrassed clients must analyze both the
amount and kind of their clients' indebtedness in order to appraise the utility
of bankruptcy. 5 Moreover, under the Reform Act, as under previous bank-
ruptcy legislation, the order in which creditors are paid and the amount they
can expect ultimately to receive from both liquidating6 and reorganizing7 debt-
* Assistant Professor, West Virginia University College of Law. B.A., Washington State Uni-
versity, 1970; J.D., Willamette University, 1977.
See Wall Street Journal, February 22, 1982 at 1.
2 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-366 (Supp. IV 1980). Hereafter the Bankruptcy Reform Act will be referred
to as either "the Reform Act" or "the Code." All references to the Code are to its 1980 version,
reflecting amendments through the 96th Congress, 2d Sess. (1980), unless otherwise noted.
3 11 U.S.C. § 103, 362, 1301 (Supp. IV 1980).
4 11 U.S.C. §§ 727 (Supp. IV 1980) (discharge for individual debtor in straight bankruptcy),
1328 (disclarge for individual debtor upon completion of Chapter 13 plan), 1141 (discharge for
individual or corporate debtor upon confirmation of Chapter 11 reorganization plan). See also 11
U.S.C. § 524 (Supp. IV 1980) (effect of discharge).
' Exceptions to discharge in straight bankruptcy include, generally, obligations to pay certain
taxes and custom's duties (see infra note 145); debts arising from credit extended in reliance upon
the debtor's fraudulent representations; debts incurred due to the debtor's fraudulent conduct
while acting as a fiduciary; debts for alimony and child support; debts to compensate for willful
and malicious injuries inflicted by the debtor; certain fines and penalties imposed by governmental
units; certain student loan obligations; undischarged debts predating earlier bankruptcies; and, in
some circumstances, debts not disclosed by the debtor in the course of bankruptcy proceedings.
See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
In addition to the possibility that certain debts will not be affected by a bankruptcy discharge,
the court may in some circumstances, usually relating to fraudulent conduct by the debtor, refuse
to grant any discharge whatsoever. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
Obviously, if substantial indebtedness will survive bankruptcy, a debtor should be counseled
to consider alternative strategies to deal with his creditors.
' "Straight" bankruptcy is the vehicle by which the debtor's nonexempt assets are liquidated
and the proceeds distributed to creditors. Exempt property is defined by 11 U.S.C. § 522 (Supp. IV
1980) and the state law of the state in which the debtor resides. See W. VA. CODE § 38-10-4 (bank-
ruptcy exemptions). See generally Vukowich, Debtors' Exemption Rights Under the Bankruptcy
Reform Act, 58 N.C. L. REv. 769 (1980). The mechanics of such straight bankruptcies are detailed
in Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-66 (Supp. IV 1980). Any person or entity
other than railroads, domestic insurance companies, banks, savings banks, cooperative banks, sav-
ings and loan associations, building and loan associations, homestead association, and credit unions
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ors is dependent upon their status as secured or unsecured creditors as well as
their place in the order of priorities for payment established by the bankruptcy
statute.8 Those who advise creditors as to the wisdom of initiating involuntary
bankruptcy proceedings against debtors must first ascertain their clients' sta-
tus and place in the bankruptcy distribution hierarchy.
This article will address the treatment of employer obligations to the West
Virginia Workmen's Compensation Fund9 in bankruptcy. The discussion is in-
tended not merely to address the narrow issue, however, but to serve as a vehi-
cle for explanation and exploration of the bankruptcy priority system10 and its
impact upon creditors and debtors.
11. BACKGROUND
In recent months increasing numbers of local and national businesses have
sought relief under the Reform Act or have been involuntarily forced into
bankruptcy by their creditors.12 Many such businesses consist of employers re-
quired by statute to participate in and contribute to the West Virginia Work-
men's Compensation Fund.ls
may be a debtor in Chapter 7, 11 U.S.C. § 109 (Supp. IV 1980).
Debtors, as an alternative to straight bankruptcy, may reorganize under Chapter 11 of the
Code. Such proceedings are in the nature of court-supervised compositions in which a plan of
rehabilitation is presented, agreed to by creditors (or in some circumstances imposed upon them),
and confirmed by the court. The debtor retains sufficient assets under the plan to continue opera-
tion of all or part of its business and creditors are paid all or part of their claims overtime. See 11
U.S.C. §§ 1101-74 (Supp. IV 1980). See generally Coogan, A Debtor's Choice of Chapters Under
the Bankruptcy Act, 1 VT. L. REv. 117 (1976); Klein, The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 53 Am.
BANm L.J. 1, 7-17 (1979).
In addition, individuals with regular income and limited indebtedness may elect a more sim-
plified rehabilitation mechanism, the Chapter 13 proceeding, in lieu of straight bankruptcy liqui-
dation or Chapter 11 reorganization. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 109(e), 1301-30 (Supp. IV 1980). See gener-
ally Epstein, Chapter 13, Its Operations, Its Statutory Requirements as to Payment and
Classification of Unsecured Claims, and Its Advantages, 20 WASHBURN L.J. 1 (1980).
8 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 506 (Supp. IV 1980) (determination of secured status), 507 (priorities), 726
(distribution of property of the estate); 1129(a)(9) (requirements for treatment of priority claims in
Chapter 11 plan), 1322(a) (treatment of priority claims in Chapter 13 plan). The prior law, the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (hereafter "the Act"), included analogous provisions regarding priority.
See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1976) (repealed Pub.L. 95-598, title IV, §§ 401(a), 402(a), 92 Stat.
2682, eff. October 1, 1979).
'W. VA. CODE § 23-3-1 (1981) (establishing fund).
10 11 U.S.C. § 507(a), 726 (Supp. IV 1980). Hereafter all references to Chapter 23 of the West
Virginia Code, unless otherwise noted, are to the 1981 version, as supplemented in 1982.
11 A debtor may commence a voluntary case in bankruptcy by filing a petition. 11 U.S.C. § 301
(Supp. IV 1980). In voluntary cases, the commencement of the case constitutes an "order for re-
lief." Id. A debtor may voluntarily liquidate and distribute his nonexempt assets under Chapter 7
or may voluntarily reorganize his affairs and rehabilitate himself and his, or its, business affairs
under Chapter 11 or Chapter 13. See supra notes 6 and 7.
12 Creditors may by filing a petition commence Chapter 7 or 11 proceedings against a debtor.
11 U.S.C. § 303(a), (b) (Supp. IV 1980). The order for relief will be granted in such cases only after
notice and hearing and a finding that the debtor is generally not paying his debts as they become
due or has been subject of a receivership within 120 days. 11 U.S.C. § 303(d), (e), (h) (Supp. IV
1980).
Is See W. VA. CODE §§ 23-1-1 to -6-1 and infra notes 87-92 and acompanying text.
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The business entities that find themselves the subjects of bankruptcy pro-
ceedings are generally insolvent or are on the brink of insolvency.' 4 A large
proportion of bankrupt business debtors owe substantial amounts to the state
under the Workmen's Compensation scheme at the time the bankruptcy pro-
ceedings are initiated.15 Amounts owed generally include past due premiums,'6
interest,' 7 and repayment obligations for compensation awarded to the employ-
ers' workers when the employers' premium payment obligations were in
default.'"
Whether the workmen's compensation-related debts of employers in bank-
ruptcy are entitled to priority in distribution of the assets of the debtor's es-
tate'9 and whether such indebtedness is dischargeable20 are questions of cur-
rent concern among both creditors and debtors.2 1 This article will discuss the
issues of priority and dischargeability of employer obligations arising under the
4 It is assumed throughout this discussion that the subjects of bankruptcies hold insufficient
nonexempt assets to fully satisfy all of their debts. Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 101(26) (Supp. IV 1980). The
distribution priority that is the focal point of this paper becomes important when such is the case.
"Insolvency" in the equitable sense is one of two alternative grounds for entry of the order for
relief in an involuntary case. See 11 U.S.C. § 303(h) and supra note 2.
" The significance of employer bankruptcies to the Workmen's Compensation Fund is re-
flected by the fact that the State Compensation Commissioner requested, and recently received, an
opinion from the Office of the Attorney General of West Virginia as to the tax or non-tax status of
state claims for obligations owed to the Workmen's Compensation Fund. See infra note 111.
'" W. VA. CODE §§ 23-2-5 to 5a (1981). Employers subject to the mandatory coverage require-
ments of the Workmen's Compensation Act must pay quarterly premiums based upon percentages
of their payroll for the preceding quarter to the state compensation fund. The percentage applied
to determine the amount of premium owed is variable from class to class of business operation,
with higher percentages, and thus higher premiums, applicable to operations entailing more haz-
ardous work. Workmen's Compensation Commissioner's 1982-83 rate schedule.
17 W. VA. CODE § 23-2-13 (1982 Supp.) (past due employer obligations bear interest at the rate
of two percent per month).
'S W. VA. CODE § 23-2-5 (1981) ("Provided, that any employer required by this chapter to
subscribe and pay premiums to the workmen's compensation fund as herein provided and who
fails to do so shall be liable to the... fund for all payments paid from the fund to his employees,
as well as for all premiums otherwise due and owing. .. ").
9 Designated categories of unsecured creditors, by reason of their status vis a vis the debtor
or the timing of the creation of their claims in relation to the bankruptcy proceedings, are entitled
to distribution of assets of the estate ahead of other, non-priority, unsecured claimants. 11 U.S.C. §
507 (Supp. IV 1980).
20 In a Chapter 7 liquidation proceeding an individual debtor, in return for surrender of his
non-exempt assets, is discharged from further obligation to satisfy pre-bankruptcy indebtedness.
11 U.S.C. § 524, 727 (Supp. IV 1980). Debtors who are not "individuals" (i.e. natural persons) are
not entitled to a discharge. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1980). Nevertheless, a corporate debtor
may utilize Chapter 7 to effect liquidation and distribution of its assets, leaving only an empty
corporate shell. In such cases, where no assets remain available for creditors, the unavailability of a
formal discharge becomes irrelevant. In Chapter 11 reorganization proceedings, the issue regarding
tax claims is whether the debtor's reorganization plan must provide for full payment of the claim
over time. See infra text accompanying note 146. In Chapter 13 debtor rehabilitation proceedings,
the issue also is one of whether or not the debtor's plan must provide for full payment. See infra
text accompanying note 147.
2, The matter of priority is of importance not only to the state claimant, but also to compet-
ing creditors for whom the amount of available assets will be depleted if sizable workmen's com-
pensation, or other "tax," obligations are given priority, and to debtors as to whom such priority
indebtedness is not dischargeable. See, e.g., In re Adams, 17 Bankr. 742 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982).
19821
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West Virginia Workmen's Compensation scheme and will, in its course, treat
related issues, most notably relating to the enforcement of liens securing the
state's claim against the employer."2
I. DISCUSSION
This article will first explain the historical nature of and reasons for a tax
priority in bankruptcy. The evolution of the definition of "tax" and factors
pertinent to application of the definition will be treated next. The following
section will demonstrate that the claims for amounts owed by employers under
state fund workers' compensation programs, such as the West Virginia Work-
men's Compensation Act, are tax claims within the meaning historically ap-
plied in bankruptcy. The article next will explore the specific provisions of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 relating to tax priorities and their application
to employers' workmen's compensation indebtedness. Finally, the ramifications
of priority treatment for workmen's compensation-related claims will be
discussed.
A. Why Is There a Tax Priority in Bankruptcy?
1. The Priority System of Distribution
The current Bankruptcy Code,23 like its predecessors, 24 contains provisions
that require certain categories of unsecured indebtedness to be paid in full
prior to payment of other unsecured claims.2 5 The priority scheme for distribu-
tion of assets is a product of legislative concern for equitable treatment of cer-
tain creditors26 coupled with legislative recognition that pragmatism and neces-
sity require priority treatment of certain other claims.
27
Pre-bankruptcy liens that are valid under state law and not avoidable
under the Bankruptcy Code are first satisfied, to the extent possible, out of the
property to which they attach.2 8 Unsecured claims against the debtor, includ-
21 The state's claim for amounts owed to it by employers under the Workmen's Compensation
Act becomes a lien against "all property of the employer." IV. VA. CODE § 23-2-5a (1981). As to
treatment of such liens in bankruptcy, see infra notes 148-56 and accompanying text.
23 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (Supp. IV 1980).
24 The 1978 Code was the first major revision of federal bankruptcy laws since the Chandler
Act of 1938. The first comprehensive scheme of distribution priorities was enacted in the 1867
bankruptcy act, although the concept of priorities in distribution for certain creditors, notably for
creditors whose claims related to administration of the bankruptcy estate and for the federal gov-
ernment, was incorporated in the bankruptcy legislation of 1800 and 1841. See 3 COLLIER ON BANK-
R PTcY 507.01 (15th ed. 1982).
25 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
26 E.g., 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(3) (Supp. IV 1980) (priority for claims of individuals for wages,
salaries or commissions); (a)(4)(priority for claims for contributions to employee benefit plans);
(a)(5) (prority for claims for repayment of consumer deposits).
27 E.g., 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1980) (priority for claims for administrative expenses);
(a)(6)(priority for designated governmental tax claims).
28 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 506(a), 725. Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 524 (Supp. IV 1980). See generally 4 COLLIER
ON BANKRupTcy § 725.01 (15th ed. 1982). Under certain circumstances the trustee may divest the
lien creditor of his lien, thus making the property available for distribution to unsecured creditors.
[Vol. 85
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ing the amounts by which a claim exeeds the value of liens securing it, are next
in line,3' but subject to the priority system of payment.30
Section 726 of the Code requires that, as to unsecured claims, assets of the
estate be distributed first in payment of claims designated as "priority
claims, 31 then to timely or excusably late non-priority claims,3 2 then to tardily
filed claims, 3 next to claims for penalties and punitive damages,3 4 then to
claims for post-petition interest,3s and, finally, any surplus is distributed to the
debtor.8 6 Each level of claims is to be paid in full before distributions are made
to the next class of claimants, and, if there are insufficient assets to satisfy any
such level, the claimants within each level will share pro rata.
37
E.g., 11 U.S.C. § 544 (Supp. IV 1980) ("strongarm" power); 547 (preference avoidance power). See
generally Teofan and Creel, The Trustee's Avoiding Powers Under The Bankruptcy Act and the
New Code, 11 ST. MARY'S L. REv. 311 (1979). In certain circumstances the debtor, too, may divest
a creditor of his lien, but only insofar as it impairs the debtor's right to claim the encumbered
property as exempt. E.g., 11 U.S.C. § 522(f), (g), (h) (Supp. IV 1980). See generally Vukowich,
Debtor's Exemption Rights Under The Bankruptcy Reform Act, 58 N.C.L. Rav. 769 (1980). Cer-
tain liens securing governmental units tax claims can be postponed to facilitate payment of prior-
ity unsecured creditors. See 11 U.S.C. § 724 (Supp. IV 1980) and infra text accompanying 155.
21 1 U.S.C. § 726(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
30 11 U.S.C. §§ 726(a)(1), 507(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
31 11 U.S.C. § 726 (Supp. IV 1980) provides:
(a) Except as provided in section 510 of this title, property of the estate shall be
distributed-
(1) first, in payment of claims of the kind specified in, and in the order specified in,
section 507 of this title;
(2) second, in payment of any allowed unsecured claim, other than a claim of a kind
specified in paragraph (1), (3), or (4) of this subsection, proof of which is-
(A) timely filed under section 501(a) of this title;
(B) timely filed under section 501(b) of this title; or
(C) tardily filed under section 501(a) of this title, if-
(i) the creditor that holds such claim did not have notice or actual
knowledge of the case in time for timely filing of a proof of such claim
under section 501(a) of this title; and
(ii) proof of such claim is filed in time to permit payment of such claim;
(3) third, in payment of any allowed unsecured claim proof of which is tardily filed
under section 501(a) of this title, other than a claim of the kind specified in paragraph
(2)(C) of this subsection;
(4) fourth, in payment of any allowed claim, whether secured or unsecured, for any
fine, penalty, or forfeiture, or for multiple, exemplary, or punitive damages, arising
before the earlier of the order for relief or the appointment of a trustee, to the extent
that such fine, penalty, forefeiture, or damages are not compensation for actual pecuni-
ary loss suffered by the holder of such claim;
(5) fifth, in payment of interest at the legal rate from the date of the filing of the
petition, on any claim paid under paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (4) of this subsection; and
(6) sixth, to the debtor.
32 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(2) supra note 31.
33 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(3) supra note 31.
3, 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(4) supra note 31.
35 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(5) supra note 31.
36 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(6) supra note 31.
37 11 U.S.C. § 726(b) (Supp. IV 1980) provides: "Payment on claims of a kind specified in
paragraph (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), or (6) of section 507(a) of this title, or in paragraph (2), (3), (4), or
(5) of subsection (a) of this section shall be made pro rata among claims of the kind specified in a
19821
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The first class of unsecured claims to receive distributions are priority
claims: "the kind specified in. .. section 507. . . ."38 Such section 507 claims
represent the statutory "bankruptcy priority" creditors. They include, in de-
scending order of entitlement to distribution:3s
particular paragraph. .. ." See supra notes 25-27, 31.
11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(1) supra note 31.
39 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (Supp. IV 1980) provides:
(a) The following expenses and claims have priority in the following order:
(1) First, administrative expenses allowed under section 503(b) of this title, and any
fees and charges assessed against the estate under chapter 123 of title 28.
(2) Second, unsecured claims allowed under sectibn 502(0 of this title.
(3) Third, allowed unsecured claims for wages, salaries, or commissions, including
vacation, severance and sick leave pay-
(A) earned by an individual within 90 days before the date of the filing of the
petition or the date of the cessation of the debtor's business, whichever occurs
first; but only
(B) to the extent of $2,000 for each such individual.
(4) Fourth, allowed unsecured claims for contributions to employee benefit plans-
(A) arising from services rendered within 180 days before the date of the filing
of the petition or the date of the cesation of the debtor's business, whichever oc-
curs first; but only
(B) for each such plan, to the extent of-
(i) the number of employees covered by such plan multiplied by $2,000;
less
(ii) the aggregate amount paid to such employees under paragraph (3)
of this subsection, plus the aggregate amount paid by the estate on behalf
of such employees to any other employee benefit plan.
(5) Fifth, allowed unsecured claims of individuals, to the extent of $900 for each
such individual, arising from the deposit, before the commencement of the case, of
money in connection with the purchase, lease, or rental of property, or the purchase of
services, for the personal, family, or household use of such individuals, that were not
delivered or provided.
(6) Sixth, allowed unsecured claims of governmental units, to the extent that such
claims are for-
(A) a tax on or measured by income or gross receipts-
(i) for a taxable year ending on or before the date of the filing of the
petition for which a return, if required, is last due, including extensions,
after three years before the date of the filing of the petition;
(ii) assessed within 240 days, plus any time plus 30 days during which
an offer in compromise with respect to such tax that was made within 240
days after such assessment was pending, before the date of the filing of the
petition; or
(iii) other than a tax of a kind specified in section 523 (a)(1)(B) or
523(a)(1)(C) of this title, not assessed before, but assessable, under applica-
ble law or by agreement, after, the commencement of the case;
(B) a property tax assessed before the commencement of the case and last
payable without penalty after one year before the date of the filing of the petition;
(C) a tax required to be collected or withheld and for which the debtor is
liable in whatever capacity;
(D) an employment tax on a wage, salary, or commission of a kind specified in
paragraph (3) of this subsection earned from the debtor before the date of the
filing of the petition, whether or not actually paid before such date, for which a
return is last due, under applicable law or under any extension, after three years
before the date of the filing of the petition;
(E) an excise tax on-
6




(b) claims of creditors who extended credit between the filing of an involuntary
petition against the debtor and the entry of an order for relief;
41
(c) claims of employees or agents for "wages, salaries or commissions...,;
42
(d) claims for contributions owed to employee benefit plans;
43
(e) claims by consumers for certain deposits;4' and
(f) governmental units' claims for certain taxes.4
5
Each level of section 507 priority claims is to be paid in full in the designated
order of priority, with assets to be shared pro rata within any priority level
to which there are insufficient assets to provide payment in full.
4 6
(i) a transaction occurring before the date of the filing of the petition
for which a return, if required, is last due, under applicable law or under
any extension, after three years before the date of the filing of the petition;
or
(ii) if a return is not required, a transaction occurring during the three
years immediately preceding the date of the filing of the petition;
(F) a customs duty arising out of the importation of merchandise-
(i) entered for consumption within one year before the date of the
filing of the petition;
(ii) covered by an entry liquidated or reliquidated within one year
before the date of the filing of the petition; or
(iii) entered for consumption within four years before the date of the
filing of the petition but unliquidated on such date, if the Secretary of the
Treasury certifies that failure to liquidate such entry was due to an investi-
gation pending on such date into assessment of antidumping or counter-
vailing duties or fraud, or if information needed for the proper appraise-
ment or classification of such merchandise was not available to the
appropriate customs officer before such date; or
(G) a penalty related to a claim of a kind specified in this paragraph and in
compensation for actual pecuniary loss.
(b) If the trustee, under section 362, 363, or 364 of this title, provides adequate
protection of the interest of a holder of a claim secured by a lien on property of the
debtor and if, notwithstanding such protection, such creditor has a claim allowable under
subsection (a)(1) of this section arising from the stay of action against such property
under section 362 of this title, from the use, sale, or lease of such property under section
363 of this title, or from the granting of a lien under section 364(d) of this title, then
such creditor's claim under such subsection shall have priority over every other claim
allowable under such subsection.
(c) For the purpose of subsection (a) of this section, a claim of a governmental unit
arising from an erroneous refund or credit of a tax shall be treated the same as a claim
for the tax to which such refund or credit relates.
(d) An entity that is subrogated to the rights of a holder of a claim of a kind speci-
fied in subsection (a)(3), (a)(4), (a)(5), or (a)(6) of this section is not subrogated to the
right of the holder of such claim to priority under such subsection.
10 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1), supra note 39.
41 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(2), supra note 39.
42 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(3), supra note 39.
43 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4), supra note 39.
4, 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(5), supra note 39.
41 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(6), supra note 39.
46 See 11 U.S.C. § 726(b); 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTcY 1 507.02 (15th ed. 1982).
1982]
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2. The Tax Priority
As can readily be seen, distributions from the estate must first be made to
each level of "priority" claimants before assets go to general, non-priority cred-
itors. The establishment of such priorities springs from legislative concern that
bankruptcy should operate less harshly on certain categories of creditors than
on others.47 Among the classes of creditors who have consistently been recog-
nized under modern bankruptcy statutes as deserving of the protection of a
payment priority are federal, state, and local governments seeking payment
certain of pre-petition taxes. 45 An understanding as to why such claims receive
priority treatment will assist in understanding why state claims for amounts
owed by employers to state worker's compensation funds such as West Vir-
ginia's, will be accorded treatment as tax priority claims.
The notion that governmental claims for pre-petition taxes should be paid
ahead of non-priority claims rests on two basic legislative insights. First, and
most importantly, recognition that taxes are levied and tax revenues are uti-
lized to fund projects and programs that promote the public good led to the
conclusion that payment of tax indebtedness had greater social utility than,
and was therefore entitled to priority as opposed to, payment of the claims of
garden-variety unsecured creditors. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit has observed:
The principle underlying tax priority is ancient and well-established. It is
one of the many illustrations of the maxim "salus populi suprema lex est". Mr.
Justice Story gave it expression and effect over 100 years ago.
"The right of priority of payment of debts due to the government, is a
prerogative of the crown well known to the common law. It is founded
not so much on any personal advantage to the sovereign, as upon mo-
tives of public policy, in order to secure an adequate revenue to sus-
tain the public burdens and discharge the public debts .... The same
policy which governed in the case of the royal prerogative, may be
clearly traced in these statutes; and as that policy has mainly a refer-
ence to the public good, there is no reason for giving them a strict and
narrow interpretation.
49
The second basis for the tax priority is more pragmatic. The mechanisms
by which tax liabilities are reported or otherwise ascertained, assessed, and col-
lected or enforced are often cumbersome, time consuming, and dependent on
taxpayer cooperation. As a result, the public tax creditor, unlike the private
creditor, may often discover its debtor to be in default long after-the-fact.
However, it is not always desirable that the taxing authority pursue immedi-
47 3 COLLIER ON BANKRuPTcY 507.02 (15th ed. 1982).
48 3 COLLIER ON BANKRuPTcY 1 507.04[6] & n.22 (15th ed. 1982).
49 In re Win. Akers, Jr., Co., 121 F.2d 846, 848 (3d. Cir. 1941) (quoting United States v. Bank
of North Carolina, 31 U.S. 29, 35 (1832)).
50 E.g., W. VA. CODE § 23-2-5 (1981) (providing for employer payment of workmen's compen-
sation premiums based on preceding quarter's payroll). The cumbersome aspects of tax collection
activities was a concern of Congress in retaining the tax priority in the 1978 Bankruptcy Code.
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ately and with a vengeance all available avenues of enforcement and collec-
tion51 since the value of forebearance is often recognized when it might enable
the defaulting taxpayer to weather temporary financial embarassment and re-
tain economic vitality.5 2 As a result, the taxing government might, for socially
desirable reasons, be less adamant a creditor than one to whom private debts
are owed. As a consequence, some creditors have benefited in the pre-bank-
ruptcy period from the circumstances attending creation, ascertainment, and
collection of the tax. Such circumstances led to the legislative conclusion that a
distribution priority for the tax claim is appropriate.53
B. What Is a "Tax" For Purposes of the Bankruptcy Distribution
Priority?
The issue of what is a "tax" for purposes of bankruptcy priority has been
influenced strongly by the "public benefit" factor that led to the initial adop-
tion and later retention of the tax priority." Although the 1978 Bankruptcy
Code has defined more specifically than past bankruptcy statutes the types of
taxes to be given priority,55 the threshold determination to be made remains,
"Is the debtor's obligation to the government unit a 'tax'?"56
The legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code discloses no congressional
intention to alter the test for determining the tax-nature of an obligation owed
the government by a debtor, so pre-Code cases explaining the nature of a "tax"
for priority purposes remain instructive.57 Early in the century the Supreme
5 E.g., The West Virginia Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, in addition to possessing
the power to institute a civil collection action against the employer and to perfect a lien against the
employer's property, may bring an action to enjoin an employer who has defaulted on its premium
payment obligations for two quarters from continuing to carry on its business. W. VA. CODE § 23-2-
5a (1981).
512 For example, if the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner were to proceed to shut down
a large employer immediately after two quarters delinquency in premium payments, the adverse
economic consequences would likely outweigh the benefits of quick payment. At minimum, such
action would punish the very workers that the Workmen's Compensation Act was intended to
benefit.
53 Of course, forebearance of tax collectors in collecting taxes results in the financially em-
harassed taxpayer having more resources immediately available to keep commercial creditors satis-
fied in the prebankruptcy period. Congress took note of this fact in enacting the tax priority sec-
tion of the Bankruptcy Code:
In business cases.. .it is a frequent occurrence that the business will stop paying its
taxes before it stops paying its other creditors, because the officers of the business know
that the detection of nonpayment is more difficult for the taxing authority than it is for a
supplier or lender, and that an unpaid supplier quickly stops shipping goods, though an
unpaid taxing authority is usually unable to take collection action for months.
H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 193, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
5963, 6151-52.
See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
Compare 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (1979), supra note 39 with former 11 U.S.C.A. § 64a(4), infra at
note 119. See, e.g., In re Adams, 17 Bankr. 742 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982).
"a 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(6) (Supp. IV 1980) specifically describes the taxes eligible for priority,
but each description, except that relating to customs duties, utilizes the term "tax." The term
"tax" is not expressly defined in the Bankruptcy Code.
'7 See U.S. v. King (In re King), 19 Bankr. 936, 938-39 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982). The tax
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Court, in New Jersey v. Anderson,5" distinguished a tax obligation from other
indebtedness. The Court held that New Jersey's claim for an annual corporate
franchise tax owed by a domestic corporation (with no assets or business activ-
ities within New Jersey) was entitled to tax priority:
Taxes are not debts.... Debts are obligations for the payment of money
founded upon contract, express or implied. Taxes are imposts levied for the
support of Government, or for some special purpose authorized by it. The con-
sent of the taxpayer is not necessary to their enforcement. They operate in
invitum60
Several early cases denying tax priority to governmental claims held that a
debtor's obligation was not a tax if it was based on part of a program not
intended to create revenues of benefit to all taxpayers.60 An "assessment
against a class for the benefit of a class""1 could not be a tax under such a view.
However, later cases, including several decided by the United States Supreme
Court,62 rejected the notion that an impost levied against a distinct group to
fund a program or provide a benefit s directed toward those who were members
of or related in some manner to the taxed group could not be considered a
"tax." Such class-oriented taxes are, like other taxes, based upon a larger
"public benefit" perceived by the enacting legislature.65
priority provision of the Code was much discussed, but the congressional debate centered on how
the tax priority would operate in relation to other priorities, treatment of tax penalties, and at
what point governmental tax claim priority would cease to attach due to the staleness of the claim.
See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 191-92, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CoDE CONG. &
ADMIN. Naws 5857-59. Cases decided under the Code continue to apply the same tests as pre-Code
decisions for determining whether a given governmental claim constitutes a "tax." E.g., In re
Beaman, 4 CoLLIR BANm. CAs. 2d (MB) 157 (D. Or. 1980).
's 203 U.S. 483 (1906).
" Id. at 492. See also In re Berkshire Hardware Co., 39 F. Supp. 663, 666 (D. Mass. 1941).
60 See, e.g., Matter of Farrell, 211 F. 212 (W.D. Wash. 1914). The Farrell decision held that
employer obligations under the Washington workers' compensation statutes were not "taxes" for
purposes of bankruptcy priority. Its rationale has been discredited. See cases and authorities infra
at notes 62 and 63 and accompanying text.
61 Matter of Farrell, 211 F. 212, 213 (W.D. Wash. 1914).
e2 See, e.g., Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495 (1937) and cases cited
therein. See also In re Pan American Paper Mills, Inc., 618 F.2d 159, 162 n. 3 (1st Cir. 1980).
" In re Pan American Paper Mills, Inc., 618 F.2d 159, 162 n. 4 (1st Cir. 1980). See State
Industrial Accident Comm'n v. Aebi, 177 Or. 361, 369-72, 162 P.2d 513, 517 (1945) (holding em-
ployer's premium obligations to a state workmen's compensation fund to be "taxes" not discharged
by bankruptcy). NADLER, THE LAw OF BANKRUPTFCY § 194 at 159 (2d ed. Supp. 1972) (for purposes
of the tax priority it "makes no difference whether the tax is for a special purpose, or whether the
funds are segregated or commingled with general funds.").
" See In re International Automated Machines, Inc., 9 Bankr. 575, 577 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1981) (holding premium obligations due to State of Ohio under its workers' compensation statutes
to be a tax for priority purposes under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898):
There has been some divergence in cases considering whether statutory charges lev-
ied for special purposes outside general revenue expenditures are taxes, "but such excep-
tions (to finding such charges to be taxes for purposes of Section 64(a)(4)) are few and
the majority opinion is that this consideration is not controlling." 3A Collier on Bank-
ruptcy 64.404 (14th ed. 1975) p. 2168, n. 5.
6' In re Win. Akers, Jr., Co., 121 F.2d 846, 850 (3rd Cir. 1941). As to the public benefit of a
workmen's compensation scheme, see State Industrial Accident Comm'n v. Aebi, 177 Or. 361, 369-
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The objection that a class-oriented levy could not qualify as a tax was
rejected by federal as well as state courts within the bankruptcy context:
A tax is an enforced contribution for the payment of public expenses. It is
laid by some rule of apportionment according to which the persons or property
taxed share the public burden, and whether taxation operates upon all within
the state or upon those of a given class or locality its essential nature is the
same."
For purposes of treatment in bankruptcy proceedings, taxes came to be defined
generally as all pecuniary burdens put upon individuals or their property, re-
gardless of consent, for the purpose of defraying the expenses of government.6
7
Under the bankruptcy statutes, including the current Code, the word
"tax" was not intended to be construed in a limited sense." It includes "all
types of involuntary exactions . . . levied by the Federal and State govern-
ments for governmental or public purposes."69 In determining whether a gov-
ernmental claim is for a tax, it is irrelevant whether the legislature established
the impost pursuant to its police or taxing powers.70 A tax can be levied on
persons or property or upon the exercise of a personal privilege, including exer-
cise of the right "to employ or be employed. . . .'71 Courts have consistently
held that state claims against insolvent employers for contributions owed to
unemployment compensation funds were tax-based and thus entitled to
priority.
7 2
The question whether a governmental exaction is a tax for bankruptcy
72, 162 P.2d 513 (1945); Mains v. J.E. Harris Co., 119 W. Va. 730, 732-33, 197 S.E. 10, 11 (1938).
See generally 1 A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAw § 2.20 (1978).
" State Industrial Accident Com'n v. Aebi, 177 Or. 361, 369-72, 162 P.2d 513, 517 (1945)
(emphasis deleted) (addressing tax nature of obligation in regard to bankruptcy discharge issues)
(quoting Houck v. Little River Drainage District, 239 U.S. 254 (1915) (a non-bankruptcy
decision)).
67 NADLER, THE LAW OF BANKRup'rcy § 194 at 158 (2d ed. Supp. 1972). See United States v.
New York, 315 U.S. 510 (1942); New Jersey v. Anderson, 203 U.S. 483 (1906).
" In re Mid America Co., 31 F. Supp. 601, 604 (S.D. IM. 1939); In re Beaman, 4 COLLIER
BANKR. CAS. 2d (MB) 157, 159 (D. Or. 1980).
" In re Mid American Co., 31 F. Supp. 601, 604 (S.D. IM. 1939). See New Jersey v. Anderson,
203 U.S. 483 (1906); In re Beaman, 4 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2d (MB) 157 (D. Or. 1980).
70 E.g., In re Mid American Co., 31 F. Supp. 601, 604 (S.D. IM. 1939); In re Otto F. Lange Co.,
159 F. 586, 588 (N.D. Iowa 1908).
71 In re Win. Akers, Jr., Co., 121 F.2d 846, 851 (3d Cir. 1941):
Taxes, which are but the means of distributing the burden of the cost of govern-
ment, are commonly levied on property or its use, but they may likewise be laid on the
exercise of personal rights and privileges. ... [L]evies, including taxes on the exercise of
the right to employ or to be employed, were known in England and the Colonies before
the adoption of the Constitution, and must be taken to be embraced within the wide
range of choice of subjects of taxation, which was an attribute of the sovereign power of
the states at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, and which was reserved to
them by that instrument.
(citations deleted) (quoting Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 508-09 (1937)).
7' New York v. United States, 118 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1941), aff'd, 315 U.S. 510 (1942); In re
Win. Akers, Jr., Co., 121 F.2d 846, 851 (3d Cir. 1941); In re Berkshire Hardware Co., 39 F. Supp.
663, 667 (D. Mass. 1941); In re Mid America Co., 31 F. Supp. 601, 604 (S.D. I1. 1939); In re
Oshkosh Foundry Co., 28 F. Supp. 412, 414 (E.D. Wis. 1939).
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purposes is, of course, a federal question.73 The label given the imposition of a
pecuniary burden by the state is not determinative,7 4 although it is unlikely
that a court would force a state to take a priority if the state officials were, for
one reason or another, not inclined to seek it. In determining whether a state
claim constitutes a tax a federal court will consider as one factor how the pur-
ported tax scheme has been treated within the state.7 5 A state court's construc-
tion of the statute will receive "great consideration," but not complete
deference.
76
In addition to the views expressed by state courts, executive bodies, and
legislatures, other important factors in establishing the tax character of the
claims include the in invitum nature of the state's scheme, its statutory basis,
and the ability of the state to collect or enforce its claim regardless of the
taxpayer's wishes.7 7 The form of collection, whether by summary proceeding,
distraint of property, retention of lien or mere ability to institute an action for
debt is of less importance.78
C. Workers' Compensation and the Tax Priority.
State workers' compensation schemes generally require that employers se-
cure compensation liability "insurance" in one of three ways. 7' The most com-
mon form of statutory workers' compensation programs rely upon private in-
surance carriers to provide coverage commensurate with mandatory statutory
coverage requirements."0 States, such as West Virginia, that require employers
3 City of New York v. Feiring, 313 U.S. 283, 285 (1941); New Jersey v. Anderson, 203 U.S.
483, 491 (1906).
1 203 U.S. at 490-91. See In re Otto F. Lange Co., 159 F. 586, 588 (N.D. Iowa 1908):
Many taxes are imposed under the name of license fees, franchise taxes, or taxes for
special purposes under some other name, and are therefore special taxes; but they are
nevertheless taxes imposed for a public purpose, no matter what the name under which
they are levied or imposed, and are clearly within the meaning of the term "tax" as used
in the bankruptcy act.
71 Accord New Jersey v. Anderson, 203 U.S. 483, 490-92 (1906); In re Berkshire Hardware, 39
F. Supp. 663, 666-67 (D. Mass. 1941). See also In re Adams, 17 Bankr. 742 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982).
7' New Jersey v. Anderson, 203 U.S. 483, 491 (1906).
7 Id. at 492.
78 Id. Statements that manner of enforcement or collection are not determinative of the issue
of tax/non-tax character are typically made in refuting arguments to the effect that the existence
of an action for debt as the taxing authority's exclusive remedy demonstrates that the obligation is
not a tax. E.g., Id. at 492-93. The existence of criminal sanctions or civil penalties for nonpayment
would seem to support the characterization of a given charge as a tax because the existence of such
sanctions is indicative of the important public purpose for and character of the obligation. The
availability of a lien to secure a governmental unit's claim has been considered a factor strongly
indicating that the claim is for a tax. See In re Adams, 17 Bankr. 742 (Bankr. E.D.Pa. 1982) (city's
claim for water and sewer rents held to be a tax).
'19 Forty-nine of the fifty states require employer participation in some form of workmen's
compensation program; the exception is Louisiana. 4 A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW §
92.10 at 17-1 (1982).
'o Such private insurance programs are found in forty-four of the fifty states, either as the sole
avenue of securing compensation coverage or in competition with state fund programs. 4 LARSON,
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAw § 92.10 at 17-2 (1982).
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to pay premiums to a state compensation funds which serves as the sole ave-
nue of securing coverage, aside from self-insurance,8 2 are in the distinct
minority.88
Because the forms of workers' compensation systems are diverse, genera-
lizing the treatment of employers' workers' compensation obligations in bank-
ruptcy proceedings has been difficult. Moreover, such compensation systems
have insurance and tort characteristics, obscuring their essential social welfare
function.8' Certainly, an employer's premiums obligation to a private compen-
sation insurance carrier providing such coverage in a jurisdiction adopting a
private coverage system would never constitute a tax priority debt.8e However,
the jurisdictions that have established state workers' compensation funds,
under which employers may or must secure coverage, have considered the mat-
ter of ensuring such compensation to be an appropriate government function.
They have embraced the compensation scheme as a public concern, to be ad-
ministered under government agency supervision and funded by a program of
employer taxation. Such states have concluded that the purpose of a workers'
compensation scheme can be best achieved as a governmental program.8 6 In
exclusive, mandatory state fund jurisdictions the adoption of workers' compen-
sation as a public prograii is total.
The West Virginia Workmen's Compensation Act8 7  establishes a
mandatory program requiring all "employers"" to pay premiums s' to a state
1 See W. VA. CODE § 23-2-1 (1981).
82 See W. VA. CODE § 23-2-9 (1981). Only three states, West Virginia, Washington and Ohio
have exclusive state fund programs with a self-insurance alternative.
85 Eighteen states have established state compensation funds, but in twelve of those states
(Arkansas, California, Colorado, Idaho, Maryland, Michigan, Montana, New York, Oklahoma, Ore-
gon, Pennsylvania, and Utah) employers may elect private coverage or, if qualified, self-insure. 4 A.
LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 92.10 (1982). The exclusive state fund states are Ne-
vada, North Dakota, Ohio, Washington, West Virginia and Wyoming. Id. Puerto Rico's statute also
provides for an exclusive governmental compensation fund. Id. at app. A, table 7, p. A-7-3.
84 1 A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 1.20 (1978).
85 The tax priority is available only for claims of "governmental units." 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(6)
(Supp. IV 1981). See 11 U.S.C. § 101(21) (Supp. IV 1981) (defining "governmental unit").
88 Larson comments that while private insurers may balk at providing coverage for high-risk
ventures, "[m]onopolistic state funds.. .seem to accept all applications from qualified employers
as a matter of routine practice... "4 A. LARSON, WORKmEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 92.53 at 17-
29 (1982).
87 W. VA. CODE § § 23-1-1 to 23-6-1 (1981).
88 Public employers required to participate in the workmen's compensation program include
state and local governments, boards of education, volunteer fire departments, and emergency ser-
vice organizations. W. VA. CODE § 23-2-1 (1981). All private persons and entities which regularly
employ others in "any form of industry, service, or business" in the state are "employers" required
to pay premiums under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Id.
Excepted from mandatory coverage are employers of six domestic servants, employers of five
or fewer employees in agricultural service, employers whose employees are employed outside the
state (other than on a temporary basis), and "casual employers" (who employ three or fewer em-
ployees on a temporary basis-not exceeding ten days per calendar quarter. Id. See Comment,
Workmen's Compensation-Meaning and Effect of Casual Employer Proviso, 58 W. VA. L. REv.
314 (1956).
89 W. VA. CODE § 23-2-5 (1981). See supra note 16.
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fund9 0 from which compensatory awards are made to workers who have "re-
ceived personal injuries in the course of and resulting from their covered em-
ployment or to the dependents, if any, of such employees in case death has
ensued. . . ."s' Employers who qualify may self-insure in lieu of participating
in the otherwise mandatory state fund scheme.
92
Employers subject to the Act must make the required premium payments
into the fund administered by the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner.
Participation is not, generally speaking, 8 elective.9 Although earlier versions
of West Virginia's, as well as other states', compensation statutes created pro-
grams that were available at the employer's election," such versions were
drafted in order to avoid perceived constitutional infirmities in mandatory pro-
grams, a problem that no longer exists." In any event, the present West Vir-
ginia Act creates a program that operates on employers in invituM.9 7 The em-
ployer's obligation to make payments under the Act is an obligation imposed
on his status as a statutory employer,9 8 rather than arising from any contrac-
tual or quasi-contractual relationship among employer, employee, and the
state. West Virginia's highest court has characterized the employer's obligation
as follows:
[D]espite our course of decisions in this area of the law, [we] are of the opinion
that the rights and duties under our workmen's compensation statute are no
longer contractual but grow out of the employer-employee status to which the
law attaches certain duties and responsibilities. The liability of employers
arises from the law itself, rather than from any agreement of the parties.0
90 W. VA. CODE § 23-3-1 (1981).
' W. VA. CODE § 23-4-1 (1981).
92 See W. VA. CODE § 23-2-9 (1981). See generally Smith v. State Workmen's Compensation
Comm'r, 219 S.E.2d 361 (W. Va. 1975) (discussing self-insurer's rights and liabilities).
"3 See supra notes 83 to 85 and accompanying text; Lester v. State Workmen's Compensation
Comm'r, 242 S.E.2d 443, 451 n. 14 (IV. Va. 1978).
" Jenkins v. Sal Chem. Co., 280 S.E.2d 243, 244 (W. Va. 1981); Pnakovich v. State Workmen's
Compensation Comm'r, 259 S.E.2d 127, 130 (W. Va. 1979). Cf. W. VA. CODE § 23-2-9 (1981) (self-
insurance; permitting voluntary participation of self-insuring employers in "surplus fund" availa-
ble to pay awards stemming from catastrophes and second injuries).
91 Lester v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 242 S.E.2d 443, 448 (W. Va. 1978) (dis-
cussing the history of the present statute).
96 Id. 242 S.E.2d at 449-50. Early compulsory workmen's compensation statutes, of both the
"private" and "state fund" variety were held unconstitutional in a number of jurisdictions. See,
e.g., Cunningham v. Northwestern Improvement Co., 44 Mont. 180, 119 P. 554 (1911); Ines v.
South Buffalo Ry., 201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E. 431 (1911). The response to such decisions was the enact-
ment of elective workmen's compensation statutes in some states and statutes covering only "haz-
ardous" employments in others. See 1 A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 5.20 (1978).
The United States Supreme Court issues a series of opinions in 1917 holding compulsory, elective
and exclusive-state-fund compensation statutes valid under the United States Constitution. Id. at
39.
'7 Jenkins v. Sal Chem. Co., 280 S.E.2d 243, 244 (W. Va. 1981); Pnakovich v. State Workmen's
Compensation Comm'r, 259 S.E.2d 127, 130 (W. Va. 1979). A contract between employer and em-
ployee to waive the benefits and burdens of the Workmen's Compensation Act is void. W. VA.
CODE § 23-2-7. See Jenkins v. Sal Chem. Co., 280 S.E.2d 243, 244 (W. Va. 1981).
" W. VA. CODE § 23-2-1 (1981).
9' Lester v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 242 S.E.2d 443, 450-51 (W. Va. 1978).
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The West Virginia Workmen's Compensation Act's scheme for mandatory
employer contributions to the state fund has the essential characteristics of
obligations held to be tax programs for purposes of the historical bankruptcy
distribution priority. Employers' obligations are to pay an impost levied by the
state to support a governmental program.100 The state establishes the obliga-
tion and its amount without the employer's consent and the employer must
pay, on pain of substantial civil I01 and even criminal,102 sanctions.
Furthermore, workers' compensation programs have been enacted for
achievement of broader social purposes than merely insuring workers against
on-the-job injuries.103 West Virginia's Workmen's Compensation Act is a prod-
uct of the legislature's exercise of police power'04 to "provide a system by
which injuries due to industry may be liquidated and compensation pro-
vided"105 with the costs allocated, ultimately, to all consumers of the products
of industry. °10 The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has expressly
stated that issues arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act are affected
by the public interest.10°
Claims arising under the state's workmen's compensation system carry all
the hallmarks of a tax obligation of the nature traditionally accorded priority
in bankruptcy distributions. The system is mandatory, established to exact
payments to a state fund that enables execution of a governmental program
furthering the general welfare and the legislation's public purpose.108 The pro-
100 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
'O'W. VA. CODE §§ 23-2-5 to 5a (1981). In addition to penalties collectible by the state, an
employer's default triggers loss of statutory immunity from actions by employees at common law
for work-related injuries and loss of the common law defenses of fellow-servant, assumption of risk
and contributory (now likely comparative) negligence. W. VA. CODE § 23-2-8 (1981); Jenkins v. Sal
Chem. Co., 280 S.E.2d 243 (W. Va. 1981).
102 Employers subject to the mandatory coverage of the Workmen's Compensation Act and
who knowingly fall to subscribe to the fund, or who knowingly fail to make reports or perform
required duties are guilty of a misdemeaner. Those who knowingly submit false sworn statements
to the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner are guilty of perjury. W. VA. CODE § 23-1-16
(1981).
203 See Lester v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 242 S.E.2d 443, 449 (W. Va. 1978)
(public has direct interest in workmen's compensation as it affects the common welfare); Mains v.
J.E. Harris Co., 119 W. Va. 730, 732-33, 197 S.E. 10, 11 (1938).
Larson has commented:
The ultimate social philosophy behind compensation liability is belief in the wisdom of
providing, in the most efficient, most dignified, and the most certain form, financial and
medical benefits of the victims of work-connected injuries which an enlightened commu-
nity would feel obliged to provide in any case in some less satisfactory form, and of
allocating the burden of these payments to the most appropriate source of payment, the
consumer of the product.
1 A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 2.20 (1978).
i4. Rogers v. State Compensation Comm'r, 140 W. Va. 376, 380-81, 84 S.E.2d 218, 221 (1954);
Blevins v. State Compensation Comm'r, 127 W. Va. 481, 496-98, 33 S.E.2d 408, 415 (1945).
105 Rogers v. State Compensation Comm'r, 140 W. Va. 376, 380, 84 S.E.2d 218, 221 (1954).
106 Mains v. J. E. Harris Co., 119 W. Va. 730, 732-33, 197 S.E. 10, 11 (1938). See generally 1 A.
LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAw § 1.20 (1978).
107 Mains v. J.E. Harris, 119 W. Va. 730, 732-33, 197 S.E. 10, 11 (1938).
108 The defaulting employer's obligation to pay not only current premiums but to pay all past
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gram's successful execution has been considered to depend upon all employers
paying the required premiums. 09 Application of the bankruptcy priority (and
accompanying nondischargeability under the Code)11 0 is consistent with the
purpose of the bankruptcy tax priority-to elevate the claims of public credi-
tors for tax revenues essential to funding of government programs above those
of garden-variety unsecured creditors.'
Most courts that have considered the matter have concluded that employ-
ers' mandatory premium obligation 2 and obligations to repay to state funds
conipensation awards made to their workers during periods in which they were
in default of premiums1 ' are entitled to tax priority in bankruptcy.'1 ' Such
decisions have recognized the public purpose of workers' compensation stat-
utes, '8 and that employers' mandatory obligations to provide revenue to de-
due premiums is another characteristic typical of a taxation scheme. See W. VA. CODE § 23-2-5
(1981). In considering a similar obligation imposed by a Puerto Rico statute, the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit commented, "The cumulative obligations underline the
point that the employer's so-called premium obligation is not the conventional premium familiar
with ordinary cases of insurance, (see 5 G. J. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 30:1 (2d ed.
1960), but is indeed a tax which is payable even if it is not advantageous to the employer." In re
Pan American Paper Mills, Inc., 618 F.2d 159, 163 (1st Cir. 1980).
10I West Virginia Coal & Coke Corp. v. State Compensation Comm'r, 116 W. Va. 701, 705, 182
S.E. 826, 828 (1935).
110 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
"I See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text. In a recent opinion the West Virginia Attor-
ney General has concluded that employers' obligations to the state under the Workmen's Compen-
sation Act constitute "taxes" for purposes of the bankruptcy priority. See Op. Att'y Gen., Sept. 7,
1982. Such a conclusion is one factor pertinent to the federal issue of priority. See supra text
accompanying note 75.
112 E.g., W. VA. CODE § 23-2-5 (1981).
112 Id.
114 See In re Pan American Paper Mills, Inc., 618 F.2d 159 (1st Cir. 1980) (unpaid premiums,
exclusive state fund statute-Puerto Rico); In re Int'l Automated Machines, Inc., 9 Bankr. 575
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981) (unpaid premiums, exclusive state fund statute); In re Beaman, 4 COL-
LIER BANKR. CAS. 2d (MB) 157 (Bankr. D. Or. 1980) (compensation repayment obligation, competi-
tive state fund statute); Cf. State Industrial Accident Comm'n v. Aebi, 177 Or. 361, 162 P.2d 513
(1945) (addressing dischargeability of claims arising under a competitive state fund statute). See
generally NADLER, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY § 194 (2d ed. Supp. 1972).
Several very old decisions do exist which deny tax treatment under the bankruptcy laws to
amounts owed by employers under workmen's compensation acts. In re Farrel, 211 F. 212 (W.D.
Wash. 1914), discussed supra note 60, rested on the unsound proposition that a levy against a class
for the benefit of a class could not be a tax. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text. Farrel
also rested on an inaccurate reading of Washington case law. See Annot., 161 A.L.R. 217, 218-19
(1946). Another early case, Mississippi Valley Trust Co. v. Oregon-Washington Timber Co., 213 F.
988 (W.D. Wash. 1914), held that Washington's workmen's compensation statutes did not impose a
"tax" on employers. Mississippi Valley addressed the issue not in the bankruptcy context but in
determining the relative priority of liens of the state and a foreclosing private creditor; the Missis-
sippi Valley court merely followed Farrell without further analysis.
One other case denying tax priority to a state claim in bankruptcy for workmen's compensa-
tion premiums exists, In re Eureka Paper Co., 44 Am. Bankr. Rep. (F.) 179 (N.D.N.Y. 1919). That
opinion was founded on the proposition that the state's claim would not be accorded priority in
bankruptcy if it did not have priority under state insolvency laws. Id. at 180. The current Code
contains no provisions relating the question of tax priority to state insolvency laws and such a test
for tax nature has not been utilized in any other cases.
"' In re Beaman, 4 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2d (MB) 159 (Bankr. D. Or. 1980); Accident Comm'r
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fray the costs of workmen's compensation programs are obligations to contrib-
ute to pay "expenses of government or undertakings authorized by it".
1 1 6
In addition, employer obligations to contribute to state unemployment
compensation funds, which have been long-recognized as bankruptcy tax prior-
ity obligations11 7 have been considered indistinguishable, for purposes of ap-
plying the priority, from required contributions to state workers' compensation
funds.118
D. The Tax Priority Under the Bankruptcy Code of 1978.
Prior to the 1978 revision of the federal bankruptcy laws, the priority ac-
corded taxes was found in section 64a of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, which
provided, in pertinent part:
The debts to have priority, in advance of the payment of dividends to
creditors, and to be paid in full out of bankruptcy estates, and the order of
payment, shall be.. .(4) taxes which became legally due and owing by the
bankrupt to the United States or to any State or any subdivision thereof which
are not released by a discharge in bankruptcy ... 1,9
This category of priority tax claims was further defined in section 17 of the
1898 Act as those taxes which became "legally due and owing" from the debtor
to the taxing authority within three years preceding bankruptcy.
1 20
Under the Bankruptcy Code, the tax priority was rewritten and lowered
from fourth to sixth in the hierarchy of priority creditors.1 2 The scope of the
tax priority was refined as well, as can be seen in the statutory language that
follows:
(a) The following expenses and claims have priority in the following order:
(6) Sixth, allowed unsecured claims of governmental units, to the extent that
such claims are for-
(A) a tax on or measured by income or gross receipts-
i. for a taxable year ending on or before the date of the filing of
the petition for which a return, if required, is last due, including
extensions, after three years before the date of the filing of the
petition;
ii. asessed within 240 days, plus any time plus 30 days during
which an offer in compromise with respect to such tax that was
made within 240 days after such assessment was pending, before
the date of the filing of the petition; or
iii. other than a tax of a kind specified in section 523(a)(1)(B) or
v. Aebi, 177 Or. 361, 162 P.2d 513 (1945).
,"'. New Jersey v. Anderson, 203 U.S. 483, 491 (1906). See also In re Pan American Paper
Mills, 618 F.2d 159, 162 (2d Cir. 1980).
"7 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 72.
118 In re Pan American Paper Mills, Inc., 618 F.2d 159 (1st Cir. 1980); State Industrial Acci-
dent Comm'r v. Aebi, 177 Or. 361, 162 P.2d 513 (1945).
"1 11 U.S.C. § 104a (1976) (repealed Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2682, efi. October 1, 1978).
10 11 U.S.C. § 35 (1976) (repealed Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2682, eff. October 1, 1978).
121 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(6) (Supp. IV 1980), supra note 39.
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523(a)(1)(C) of this title, not assessed before, but assessable,
under applicable law or by agreement, after, the commencement
of the case;
(B) a property tax assessed before the commencement of the case and
last payable without penalty after one year before the date of the
filing of the petition;
(C) a tax required to be collected or withheld and for which the
debtor is liable in whatever capacity;
(D) an employment tax on a wage, salary, or commission of a kind
specified in paragraph (3) of this subsection earned from the debtor
before the date of the filing of the petition, whether or not actually
paid before such date, for which a return is last due, under applicable
law or under any extension, after three years before the date of the
filing of the petition;
(E) an excise tax on-
i. a transaction occurring before the date of the filing of the
petition for which a return, if required, is last due, under appli-
cable law or under any extension, after three years before the
date of the filing of the petition; or
ii. if a return is not required, a transaction occurring during the
three years immediately preceding the date of the filing of the
petition;
(F) a customs duty arising out of the importation of merchandise-
i. entered for consumption within one year before the date of
the filing of the petition;
ii. covered by an entry liquidated or reliquidated within one
year before the date of the filing of the petition; or
iii. entered for consumption within four years before the date of
the filing of the petition but unliquidated on such date, if the
Secretary of the Treasury certifies that failure to liquidate such
entry was due to an investigation pending on such date into as-
sessment of antidumping or countervailing duties or fraud, or if
information needed for the proper appraisement or classification
of such merchandise was not available to the appropriate cus-
toms officer before such date; or
(G) a penalty related to a claim of a kind specified in this paragraph
and in compensation for actual pecuniary loss. (Emphasis added).121
Rather than retaining a general priority for any taxes that become legally
due and owing from the debtor to the taxing authority within three years of
bankruptcy, the Bankruptcy Code extends the tax priority only to taxes specif-
ically described in the statute. Among the taxes so described are "employment
taxes" on wages, a description fitting precisely the mandatory premium obliga-
tions owed by employers to the Workmen's Compensation Fund.123
t2 Id.
'" See W. VA. CODE § 23-2-5 (1981), which provides inter alia: "each employer .. .shall pay
the premiums of liabilities based upon and being such a percentage of the payroll of such em-
ployer... ." The mandatory obligation to pay such premiums, arising as it does by law by reason
of the taxpayers status as a covered "employer," Lester v. State Workmen's Compensation Com-
missioner, 242 S.E.2d 443, 450-51 (W. Va. 1978), constitutes a tax on exercise of the privilege of
employing others. In re Win. Akers, Jr., Co., 121 F.2d 846, 851 (3d Cir. 1941). See supra note 71.
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The legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code indicates that priority tax
claims were specifically enumerated and described in the Code in order to
make application of the priority more apparent in "complex situations in
which tax collection issues arise" and to clear up "uncertainties and ambigui-
ties in the tax rules of.. .bankruptcy law as well as certain loopholes under
which some debtors have been able to exploit the administrative processes of a
governmental unit so as to escape taxes unfairly.' 24 The House Committee on
the Judiciary noted that although the bill before it specifically described the
taxes entitled to priority, the taxes specified "closely follow the categories
granted priority under the Bankruptcy Act...' 28 with the exception of elimi-
nating the priority of tax penalties not representing repayment to the taxing
authority of "pecuniary loss. ' 12s The legislative history indicates that the
drafters of the Code intended to cast the net carefully to capture priority dis-
tributions for taxes and to mend the holes through which some debtors es-
caped tax liability in bankruptcy unfairly.' 27 If anything, one must conclude
that changes in the tax priority under the Code were intended to retain a com-
prehensive, inclusive tax priority and to eliminate the priority only for obliga-
tions which did not actually fund the tax-supported program.12
As discussed above, the West Virginia employer's obligation to pay premi-
ums based on his reported payroll fits precisely the category of "employment
tax," particularly in light of legislative history indicating that the Code's prior-
124 S. REP. No. 989, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS. 14, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
5787, 5800. A primary concern in Congress's estimation was the impact that ready discharge of tax
obligations in bankruptcy would have upon tax systems dependent on taxpayer cooperation for
efficient operation. The Senate Judiciary Committee expressed concern that if all tax debts were
discharged and if bankruptcy proceedings held little hope of payment (as would be the case absent
priority treatment), other taxpayers would react to a perceived unfairness by failing to cooperate
with taxing authorities:
Since tax authorities are creditors of practically every taxpayer, another important
element is that tax collection rules for bankruptcy cases have a direct impact on the
integrity of the Federal, State and local tax systems. These tax systems, generally based
on voluntary assessment, work to the extent that the majority of taxpayers think they
are fair. This presumption of fairness is an asset which should be protected and not
jeopardized by permitting taxpayers to use bankruptcy as a means of improperly avoid-
ing their tax debts. To the extent that debtors in a bankruptcy are freed from paying
their tax liabilities, the burden of making up the revenues thus lost most be shifted to
other taxpayers.
Id.
To the extent that West Virginia employers' debts to the Workmen's Compensation Fund go
unpaid in bankruptcy, other employers may expect higher premium tax rates. According such in-
debtedness priority as a tax will reduce bankruptcies' impact on the Fund, as will nondis-
chargeability of the tax debt. This is precisely the intended function of the Code's interrelated tax
priority and nondischargeability provisions. Of course, in the case of corporate debtors in straight
bankruptcies, nondischargeability is of reduced significance, see supra note 20, and the priority
provision is therefore of increased importance.
125 H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 190, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5963, 6151.
,26 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a)(6)(G) & 726(a)(4)(1979).
17 S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5787, 5799-5800.
,28 Id. See also 11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a)(6)(G) & 726(a)(4) (Supp. IV 1980).
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ity was intended to remain much the same as that provided by the Act. 129 The
committee report on the Senate version of the bill indicates that the em-
ployer's obligations for social security, railroad retirement and unemployment
compensation taxes were considered to be priority "employment taxes."130 The
examples proffered by the Senate Committee cannot, however, be taken as ex-
clusive, particularly in light of the indistinguishability of state-fund workmen's
compensation programs from state unemployment compensation programs
under the court-enunciated principles governing proper application of the dis-
tribution priority.13 1
The conclusion that the employer's premium obligation under West Vir-
ginia law constitutes an employment tax permits the State to obtain priority
payment of its claims for premiums owed by the employer-debtor for which
returns were due within three years of the filing of the petition.13 2 Premiums
owed for periods for which returns were due more than three years prior to the
petition in bankruptcy will be treated as general, unsecured, nonpriority
claims. 33 Interest accrued on the employer's obligation in the pre-petition pe-
riod will be a part of the priority claim.13 4 Post-petition interest on such obli-
gations at the legal rate will be paid only in the event all unsecured creditors
and all claims for (noncompensatory) penalties are fully paid.135
The employer's obligation to repay the Workmen's Compensation Fund
for all benefits paid from the fund to his employees while he is in default of his
premium payment obligation should also qualify for tax priority in distribu-
tion.136 Such an obligation to the fund represents an involuntary impost that is
129 See supra note 125.
0 S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 70, reprinted in § 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWs 5787, 5856.
"3'. See In re Pan American Paper Mills, Inc., 618 F.2d 159 (1st Cir. 1980). In considering an
employer's obligations under Puerto Rico's "state" fund compensation program and after noting
that the term "taxes" for bankruptcy priority purposes is to be construed broadly, the court
stated:
That broad approach led lower courts to hold that where, pursuant to an unemploy-
ment compensation law, a state exacts... so-called "contributions" a state's claim for
such contributions is entitled to priority under Bankruptcy Act § 64(a)(4)....
We see no reason not to apply the same approach to situations where pursuant to
workmen's compensation law a state... exacts from an employer so-called "premiums."
State Industrial Insurance Commission v. Aebi, 177 Or. 361, 162 P.2d 513 (1945). The
reason that such premiums should be treated as taxes within § 64(a)(4) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act is that they are pecuniary obligations imposed by the government for the
purpose of defraying the expenses of an undertaking which it authorized.
618 F.2d 159, 162 (footnote deleted). See also In re International Automated Machines, Inc., 9
Bankr. 575 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio, W.D. 1981).
1.2 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(6)(D) (Supp. IV 1980).
133 Id.
.3, Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
'31 Claims for post petition interest will virtually never be paid as such claims are senior in the
distribution order only to the debtor's right to undistributed surplus assets of the estate. See 11
U.S.C. § 726(a)(5).
,-6 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(6)(E) (Supp. IV 1980). See In Re Beaman, 4 COLLIER BANKR. CAs. 2d
(MB) 157 (Bankr. D. Or. 1980).
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part and parcel of the overall program and employment tax scheme.137 More-
over, the obligation represents a penalty "related to" the employment tax and
intended to compensate the state for "actual pecuniary loss." ' s Finally, and
most persuasively, the repayment obligation is accurately characterized as an
excise tax entitled to priority. 39 A similar obligation under the Oregon's work-
ers' compensation statute was recently held to be an excise tax on a pre-bank-
ruptcy transaction, separately and specifically entitled to sixth distribution pri-
ority.1 4 0 The reasoning employed by the Oregon bankruptcy court in so holding
has been extended in a recent case arising in the Bankruptcy Court for the
Eastern District of Tennessee which held that fees asessed against coal miners
under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act 14 1 constituted priority,
nondischargeable excise taxes.
142
E. Dischargeability and Related Issues
In Chapter 7 liquidation proceedings under the Bankruptcy Code, only
"individual" debtors may receive a discharge of pre-petition indebtedness.
43
,17 See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(6)(D) (Supp. IV 1980).
,38. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(6)(G) (Supp. IV 1980). The argument proceeds on the premise that
compensation paid to employees of employers in default represents out-of-pocket expenditures by
the fund and such expenditures are required by statute to be made, notwithstanding the employ-
ers' default. W. VA. CODE § 23-2-5 (1981). Because the Fund is entitled to recover the benefits
paid, until repayment is received the amount represents "pecuniary loss." The argument is some-
what circular, but absent the statutory mandate that employees of defaulting employers not be
denied benefits (a mandate that indicates the program is a social welfare program rather than
merely a system of insurance) the Fund would not be expected to make awards to employees of
defaulting employers.
"'. See U.S.C. § 507(a)(6)(E) (Supp. IV 1980).
14 The Bankruptcy Court for the District of Oregon held that an employer's benefit repay-
ment obligation to the state fund under Oregon's worker's compensation statute, similar to the
mandatory state fund program of West Virginia, constitutes a priority "excise" tax. The court held
that an employer's obligation to repay the state for benefits paid to its workers was an excise tax
under 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(6)(E) and, therefore, not discharged by the employer's bankruptcy. Ac-
cording to the court, the "excise tax" for priority and nondischargeability purposes was intended
to be construed flexibly and was designed to encompass "all indirect taxes not otherwise included
in § 507(a)(6)." In re Beaman, 4 COLLIER BANKR. CAs. 2d (MB) 157, 160 (D. Or. 1980).
The court found the employer's obligaiton clearly to be a "tax" before going on to characterize
it as an "excise tax":
The requirement that noncomplying employers reimburse the state for benefits paid to
their injured workers promotes a governmental interest which would otherwise be
funded by the State Administrative Fund and by all employers who contribute indirectly
or directly to the fund. The debt is a tax on noncomplying or outlaw employers. Neither
compliance with the law nor payment of the tax imposed is elective once benefits are
paid to an injured worker.
Id. at 159. Under the Code, the questions of priority and non-dischargebility hinge on the same
issues. See infra note 145.
1 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201, 1232a (Supp. IV 1980).
142 U.S. v. King (In re King), 19 Bankr. 936 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982). The court first held the
reclamation fees to be "taxes," see 19 Bankr. 937-38 and discussion supra at notes 67 to 72. It then
went on to explain that an "excise tax," for bankruptcy and other purposes is a very broad concept
encompassing virtually all indirect taxes, such as employer obligations under state fund workers'
compensation programs. Id., 19 Bankr. at 939.
141 See supra note 20.
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Corporate debtors are not discharged of their obligations.144 To the extent a
claim against an individual debtor for amounts owed under a state fund com-
pensation program such as West Virginia's qualifies for the bankruptcy tax
distribution priority, it will not be discharged in bankruptcy."
45
As for debtors reorganizing under Chapter 11, the Code requires that the
plan of reorganization provide for payment of the tax claim either fully in cash
on confirmation, or by deferred cash payments of a value equal to the allowed
amount of the claim on the date of confirmation, within six years of the date
the tax obligation was assessed.1 46 Individual debtors undergoing rehabilitation
under Chapter 13 of the Code must provide for full payment of all priority
claims, including a tax claim, within their rehabilitation plans.1 47
In the event that the State has filed a lien securing the employer's obliga-
tion"4 that lien will not be avoidable by the trustee unless it is unperfected149
or unenforceable on the date the petition is filed. 150 Distribution of proceeds of
the sale of property encumbered by such a lien, however, is subject to special
subordination rules governing tax liens.1'5 Generally speaking, the provisions
14 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1980); see supra note 20.
145 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1980). The debt may remain undischarged even if more
than three years old if the employer failed to file a return, filed a late return within 2 years of
bankruptcy, or fradulently evaded the tax. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(B) & (C) (Supp. IV 1980).
.46 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(C) (Supp. IV 1980). This requirement is subject to waiver by the
claimant in the event he and the trustee agree to different terms. Id.
147 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1980). As under Chapter 11, the claimant may agree to
different treatment. Id.
148 W. VA. CODE § 23-2-5a (1981).
1-9 11 U.S.C. § 545(2) (Supp. IV 1980). Because the lien does not become effective upon the
filing of bankruptcy or the occurrence of other insolvency-related events, it is not avoidable under
§ 545(1). Generally speaking, "perfection" will take place at the time that the lien is docketed
because docketing is the act which renders the lien enforceable against a bona fide purchaser. W.
VA. CODE § 23-2-5a (1981). See generally 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 545.04[2] (15th ed. 1982).
15 See supra note 149.
'8' The lien for taxes will be junior to liens of other creditors who are senior lienors under
state law. In addition, priority unsecured creditors under 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3), (a)(4)
and (a)(5) (Supp. IV 1980), see supra text accompanying notes 28-32, are entitled to distributions
from the encumbered property before the property or proceeds from its sale are distributed to the
tax lienor:
§ 724. Treatment of certain liens
(a) The trustee may avoid a lien that secures a claim of a kind specified in section
726(a)(4) of this title.
(b) Property in which the estate has an interest and that is subject to a lien that is
not avoidable under this title and that secures an allowed claim for taxes, or pro-
ceeds of such property, shall be distributed-
(1) first, to any holder of an allowed claim secured by a lien on such prop-
erty that is not avoidable under this title and that is senior to such tax lien;
(2) second, to claims specified in sections 507(a)(1), 507(a)(2), 507(a)(3),
507(a)(4), and 507(a)(5) of this title, to the extent of the amount of such
allowed tax claim that is secured by such tax lien;
(3) third, to the holder of such tax lien, to any extent that such holder's
allowed claim that is secured by such tax lien exceeds any amount distrib-
uted under paragraph (2) of this subsection;
(4) fourth, to any holder of an allowed claim secured by a lien on such
property that is not avoidable under this title and that is junior to such tax
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relating to distributions of property subject to nonavoidable tax liens provide
that the lienor will be subodinated to the claims of creditors with priority
under section 507.152 Thus, tax liens that are not avoided by the trustee1 5 3 are
not treated in the same manner as other nonavoidable liens.'"
The tax lien will be accorded its appropriate rank as against junior and
senior liens on the same property. 155 However, the property or its proceeds, to
the extent subject to the lien, will be distributed first to the unsecured priority
claimants designated in section 507.158 Thus, the tax lienor will be subordi-
nated to claims for administrative expenses, creditors whose claims arose be-
tween the filing of an involuntary proceeding and entry of an order for relief or
appointment of a trustee, wage claims, claims for contributions to employee
benefit plans, and consumer deposit refund claims.1 57 After distributions to the
unsecured priority claimants have been made, the tax lienor will receive any
undistributed property or proceeds encumbered by its tax lien.158 Thereafter,
junior lienors will be paid and, if value in the encumbered property remains,
the tax claimant will receive the balance of its entire allowed claim originally
secured by the lien before the property or its proceeds go to the estate.5 9 The
tax lien will be avoided to the extent it secures a "penalty, fine or forfeiture"
not imposed to compensate the taxing authority for pecuniary loss.1s0
The state's claim for a "tax" entitled to priority is not limited to tax obli-
gations which "arose" prior to filing the petition. In other words, if the obliga-
tion to make payment of premiums on pre-petition wages did not mature until
lien;
(5) fifth, to the holder of such tax lien, to the extent that such holder's
allowed claim secured by such tax lien is not paid under paragraph (3) of
this subsection; and
(6) sixth, to the estate.
(c) If more than one creditor is entitled to distribution under a particular -Para-
graph of subsection (b) of this section, distribution to such creditors under such
paragraph shall be in the same order as distribution to such creditors would have
been other than under this section.
(d) A statutory lien whose priority is determined in the same manner as the prior-
ity of a tax lien under section 6323 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26
U.S.C. 6323) shall be treated under subsection (b) of this section the same as a tax
lien.
11 U.S.C. § 724 (Supp. IV 1980).
152 Id. See supra notes 38-46 and accompanying text. The special treatment of creditors with
claims entitled to priority under section 507 represents a legislative judgment that the claims of
secured creditors who are governmental taxing authorities should be postponed vis a vis the credi-
tors whom, by reason of status or administrative necessity, must be paid before virtually all others
(except secured claims of private creditors).
,' See supra note 149.
'' See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
'' 11 U.S.C. §724(b)(1), (3) (Supp. IV 1980).
,' 11 U.S.C. §724(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
,17 11 U.S.C. §724(b)(2), (3) (Supp. IV 1980).
18 11 U.S.C. §724(b)(3) (Supp. IV 1980).
"' 11 U.S.C. §724(b)(5) (Supp. IV 1980).
,' See 11 U.S.C. § 724(a), supra note 151; § 726(a)(4) (Supp. IV 1980), supra note 31. Cf. 11
U.S.C. § 507(a)(6)(G) (Supp. IV 1980), supra note 39.
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after the petition was filed, the state's claim for those premiums may be as-
sessed after the petition is filed, notwithstanding the automatic stay, and the
claim will be treated as arising before bankruptcy.101
CONCLUSION
Among the unsecured debts that are by their nature entitled to priority in
distribution of the assets of a debtor's estate in bankruptcy are designated
"taxes" owed to governmental entities. As an impost involuntarily levied
against employers to fund a program established by government to fulfill a
public welfare purpose, "premium" obligations of employer's under state fund
workers' compensation programs are "employment taxes" entitled to sixth pri-
ority in bankruptcy distributions. Interest accruing before the filing of the pe-
tition on such unpaid obligations receives the same priority. Employers' obliga-
tions to repay the state fund for awards made to employees for injuries
sustained during periods of employer delinquency are entitled to the same pri-
ority as an "excise tax," as a part of the overall "employment tax" scheme, or
as a tax-related penalty that compensates the state for pecuniary loss.
To the extent the claim qualifies as a priority tax claim, it is not dis-
chargeable in a Chapter 7 liquidation. In the business reorganization context of
Chapter 11 and the individual debtor rehabilitation context of Chapter 13,
such claims, to the extent they qualify for priority, must be paid in full over
time.
The obligations of employers to state workers' compensation funds are but
one example of "tax" debts for bankruptcy purposes that may appear at first
blush to be programs without generally appreciated tax characteristics. The
tax character of obligations such as those owed under state fund workers' com-
pensation schemes has substantial impact upon the amount of assets available
to general unsecured creditors as well as upon the extent of discharge available
in bankruptcy. Before bankruptcy is initiated, a thorough analysis of the
amount and character of all of the debtor's indebtedness is a necessary and
prudent first step.
-6- 11 U.S.C. § 502 (i) (Supp. IV 1980).
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